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LANGUAGE MATTERS
JANE B. BARON*

INTRODUCTION

At a pivotal moment in the charming (although hardly
original) film Notting Hill,' the character played by Julia Roberts,
a ravishingly beautiful and blazingly popular actress named Anna,
stands alone with the character played by Hugh Grant, a sweet
and nerdy bookseller named William. After apologizing for the
rudeness with which she has responded to his dogged and wellmannered devotion, Anna seeks to restore their ruptured
relationship and to declare what she has now realized to be her
true feelings. "I'm just a girl," she says, "standing in front of a boy,
and asking him to love her."
In the context of the movie, this line is meant to feel good:
Anna has seen the error of her ungracious ways, the tables have
finally been turned in William's favor, and the happy ending that
loomed over the movie from the outset now seems certain to occur.
As a sucker for happy endings and sappy love stories, I did feel
good, but I also felt distracted. "A girl?" I thought. Earlier in the
movie, Anna described herself as being twenty-nine years old. My
daughter is fifteen and already seems miles from the girl who used
to fit in my lap. Most importantly, did feminists not fight for a
long time for women to be called "women"?
Of course, if you change the line, you change the meaning.
Try "I'm just a woman, standing in front of a man, asking him to
love her." At best, you get the flavor of a grade B bodice ripper
romance; at worst, this is soft core pornography. Language
matters.
This "girl" thing is troubling. As the film moves from Anna's
declaration towards the final reconciliation between her and
William, Anna becomes ever less the powerful, self-confident,
independent popular icon. William does not immediately agree (as
requested) to resume their ruptured relationship, but when he
* Professor of Law, Temple University School of Law. I am grateful to the
organizers of John Marshall Law School's November 1999 Conference on The
Languages of Race, Feminism, Philosophy, and Anthropology for inviting me

to give the talk from which this paper was prepared. Thanks also to Rick
Greenstein for comments on earlier drafts.
1. NOWING HILL (Universal Studios, Inc. 1999).
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finally does, Anna's relieved and grateful smile could be drawn
from a 1950s comic book depicting a love-struck teenager who has
been waiting to melt into the arms of the man of her dreams. We
last see the couple together in the park; Anna lies with her head in
William's lap as he reads to her. She is pregnant, and if she is not
also barefoot she might as well be. The headline could read,
"Megastar Finds Long Sought Happiness as Housewife."
Perhaps my judgment is too harsh. After all, this is only a
movie, and a kind of formula piece, at that. Girl meets boy, falls in
love, resists, is finally won over and lives happily ever after. This
progression has entertained over and over again, in Philadelphia
Story, in The Graduate, in that even more popular Julia Roberts
movie, Pretty Woman. Why not in Notting Hill?
The formula is entertaining. It is also a stereotype. Like
many other stereotypes, it may not be inherently or necessarily
inaccurate or harmful-women and men do fall in love, overcome
obstacles, start families, and what could be wrong with that? Yet
the notion that true happiness lies in landing the right man, in
marrying him and being the mother of his child-this notion
obviously has not been harmless for women over time. The same
is true for the term "girl." It is not an inherently or necessarily
insulting term, especially when used-not by a man-but by a
woman, and about herself at that. And yet the description of
women as children has also not been harmless for women over
time.
The harmfulness or harmlessness of stereotypes depends in
important measure on context, but context is not always
something that can be controlled.
One powerful insight of
contemporary critical thought derives from this observation:
Apparently innocent images and expressions can reinforce and
entrench offensive ideas. "I'm just a girl standing in front of a boy,
and asking him to love her" is just a line in a frothy film.
However, it also re-enacts and makes vital in the 1990s a vision of
women and love that was taken for granted in the 1950s and that
was bitterly fought against beginning in the 1960s. The negative
implications may not have been intended or even considered by
anyone, including the screenwriters, but no one can dictate
whether the viewer sees the end as a formulaic, hackneyed (albeit
romantically enjoyable) stereotype or as expressing a deep and
abiding truth about the aspirations of all women. 2
Another way of saying all this is that visions of women are
socially constructed, built from the language in which we speak of
them-including whether we call them "girls"-and from the stories
we tell about them-including the stories in films such as Notting

2. See generally Steven Winter, The Power Thing, 82 VA. L. REV. 721
(1996).
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Hill.3 The recognition that what we take to be the reality of
women's nature (or of gender more generally, or of sex, race, class,
and so forth) is not essential or given, but constructed and
contested has largely been taken to be liberating.4 When, for
example, the "differences" that once were thought to justify
treating women with less respect than men could be shown to be
neither given nor natural, but rather the product of a comparison
to an unstated male norm, the justification for the differential
treatment weakened substantially, if not altogether.5
However, the point of my Notting Hill example is that social
construction is complex. Consider stereotypes. When we call
something a stereotype, we mean to emphasize its artificiality, its
distortion, the ways in which it oversimplifies a complex reality.
Yet we also know that, for all their artificiality, distortion and
oversimplification, stereotypes are part of the mental equipment
with which we apprehend and thus further construct the reality of
the social world.6 Merely labeling an idea "stereotypical" will not
necessarily rob it of its power. Even if we could magically rid
ourselves of all our current stereotypes, we would not see more
clearly into a purer reality. If, as social construction theory
teaches, all seeing derives from some perspective and in that sense
is partial, then all our perceptions are skewed by their starting
points-and of course, we cannot think without starting points or
"from nowhere."7
We may be able to acknowledge the

3. For a particularly clear and helpful explanation of the phenomenon of
social construction, with multiple examples, see Lawrence Lessig, The
Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943 (1995).
4. For the view that social constructionism is not liberating, see, e.g.,
Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, The 200,000 Cards of Dimitri Yurasov:
Further Reflections on Scholarship and Truth, 46 STAN. L. REV. 647 (1994)
(discussing how social constructionism may cause "scholars [to] refrain from
publishing what they believe to be true when their works would undermine
community or otherwise prove politically counterproductive"); Steven G. Gey,
Why Rubbish Matters: The Neoconservative Underpinnings of Social
Constructionist Theory, 83 MINN. L. REV. 1707 (1999) (discussing the role of
social constructionism).
5. For the clearest and most lucid explanation of this point, see Martha
Minow, The Supreme Court 1986 Term-Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101
HARV. L. REV. 10, 13-15, 39-46 (1987).
6. See, e.g., Martha Minow, Feminist Reason: Getting It and Losing It, 38
J. LEGAL EDUC. 47, 51-53 (1988). For an account of this phenomenon in
cognitive terms, see Steven L. Winter, Transcendental Nonsense, Metaphoric
Reasoning, and the Cognitive Stakes for Law, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1105 (1989);
Steven L. Winter, The Cognitive Dimension of the Agon Between Legal Power
and Narrative Meaning, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2225 (1989) [hereinafter Winter,
The Cognitive Dimension].
7. The quote is from THOMAS NAGEL, THE VIEW FROM NOWHERE (1986).
On perspective, see Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV.
L. REV. 829, 881 (1990) stating:
Truth is partial in that the individual perspectives that yield and judge
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presuppositions with which we make our inquiries, but we cannot
do without them altogether, and so our new notions-of women, of
others who are demarked as "different"-will in this sense be but
new, alternative stereotypes.
This article reflects on the themes just introduced: the way in
which language matters, how we use and abuse stereotypes, and,
most of all, the liberatory potential of understanding that
language and stereotypes (and so much else) are social
constructions. My vehicle will be literature, specifically a short
story entitled Counsel for Oedipus by the Irish author Frank
O'Connor.8
Literature is a rather obvious site to examine
connections between language and the law. Like the idea of social
construction, literature has often been touted for its potential to
upset what we take for granted, to open our eyes to our
unacknowledged assumptions.9
In this respect, the law and
literature movement shares much with feminist jurisprudence,
which has also sought to uncover and to challenge hidden
preconceptions-about such matters as truth, objectivity, or
gender-that lurk within the law, often to the distinct detriment of
women."0 Indeed the two movements have often drawn from and
relied upon each other, so that it is not uncommon to see feminists
employ literary works to support or critique claims about legal
issues affecting women or to see literary theorists analyze legal
materials as "texts."" More importantly, there is an interesting

truth are necessarily incomplete. No individual can understand except
from some limited perspective ....As a result, there will always be
"knowers" who have access to knowledge that other individuals do not
have, and no one's truth can be deemed total or final.
See also Kim Lane Scheppele, Foreword: Telling Stories, 87 MICH. L. REV.

2073, 2090 (1989) ("Observers, even those not directly involved in a dispute,
bring with them a conceptual scheme already formed, a set of presuppositions

and expectations, that influences what they see and report ....The 'neutral
observer's' point of view is no less a point of view than any other[.]").
8. The story is anthologized in Frank O'Connor, Counsel for Oedipus, in
LAW IN LITERATURE: LEGAL THEMES IN SHORT STORIES 442 (Elizabeth Villers
Gemmette ed., 1992).
9. For a summary of the claims, see generally Jane B. Baron, Law,
Literature,and the Problems of Interdisciplinarity,108 YALE L.J. 1059 (1999).
10. See, e.g., Bartlett, supra note 7, at 862-63:

Feminists' substantive analyses of legal decisionmaking have revealed
to them that so-called neutral means of deciding cases tend to mask, not
eliminate, political and social considerations from legal decisionmaking.

Feminists have found that neutral rules and procedures tend to drive
underground the ideologies of the decisionmaker, and that these

ideologies do not serve women's interests well.

Disadvantaged by

hidden bias, feminists see the value of modes of legal reasoning that
expose and open up debate concerning the underlying political and

moral considerations.
11. See, e.g., Linda R. Hirshman, Bronte, Bloom, and Bork: An Essay on the
Moral Education of Judges, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 177 (1988). See also Anita L.
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structural similarity to arguments made both by adherents of the
law and literature movements (whom I shall hereinafter call lawand-lits) and by legal feminists. Both groups tend to identify and
to highlight the way legal procedures, language, and concepts
operate in ways that are different from conventions operative
outside law-in the ordinary world of day to day life, or in the
imaginative world of fiction, for example. These techniques of
compare-and-contrast have been enormously useful in heightening
consciousness of the ways in which, wholly apart from direct
commands and sanctions, law operates as a system of social
control. On the other hand, as I hope to demonstrate, these
techniques are also dangerous, for they have the potential to fix,
naturalize, and reify a border separating a domain of "law" from
the ordinary realm in which real humans live their lives."2 They
are, in other words, part of the way the concept of law is itself
socially constructed by those who would reform it into a kind of
evil empire that will forever require reformation. There is no way
to notice social construction that does not participate in further
social construction, and I want to emphasize that this is a process
that cannot be controlled.
I.

FRANK O'CONNOR'S COUNSEL FOR OEDIPUS

I must at this point insert several disclaimers. First, I have
already referred to the law and literature and the feminist
jurisprudence movements as if each were a single, monolithic
entity. Quite the opposite is true. The law and literature
movement encompasses a wide variety of concerns and
methodologies; its internal divisions are deep enough to have
prompted some to question whether there is a thread strong
enough to hold the disparate concerns together.13 Similarly, there
is not one feminist jurisprudence but many, from "difference"
feminism to "dominance" feminism, to "babe" feminism, just to
name a few. 4 Nor is there clarity about the identity and nature of

Allen, The Jurisprudence of Jane Eyre, 15 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 173, 177
(1992), noting that the interaction should work both ways, so that not only can

literary theory be used to interrogate legal language and concepts, but
'perspectives taken from law can illuminate literary texts." For essays
written from a variety of feminist legal and literary perspectives, see BEYOND
PORTIA: WOMEN, LAW, AND LITERATURE IN THE UNITED STATES (Jacqueline

St. Joan & Annette Bennington McElhiney eds., 1997).
12. For an argument that this problem is common to many "law and" lit
movements, see Jane B. Baron, InterdisciplinaryLegal Scholarship as Guilty

Pleasure: The Case of Law and Literature, in LAW AND LITERATURE 21
(Michael Freeman & Andrew D.E. Lewis eds., 1999).
13. See Baron, supra note 9, at 1071-73, 1072 n.65.
14. For one overview, see, e.g., Linda J. Lacey, We Have Nothing to Fear but
Gender Stereotypes: Of Katie and Amy and "Babe Feminism," 80 CORNELL L.
For a slightly different overview, describing feminist
REV. 612 (1995).
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the "woman" for whom any of these feminisms speak. 5 In
describing the claims and strategies of these movements, I must
oversimplify to some degree. I have tried to capture what is
typical without engaging in caricature, but as I will develop in this
essay, the line can be thin.
Moreover, I am about to engage in practices that look very
much like practices I have critiqued elsewhere. Specifically, in the
sections that follow, I will summarize the plot of a literary work,
and then describe multiple ways in which that work might
plausibly be read. I have poked fun at other scholars' analyses of
stories, poems, and novels. 6 Therefore, it is fair to ask why my
readings should be treated differently. In the end, only the reader
can decide. It may be helpful to point out that, unlike some in the
law and literature movement, I do not believe that stories such as
Counsel for Oedipus have a single meaning for law. If they do
have such a meaning, I am not sure I can determine or defend it.'
I am less concerned with what O'Connor's story might "mean"
than in the way in which feminists and law-and-lits might use it to
illustrate claims about the nature of legal language and
argumentation. My focus, in other words, is less on the story itself
than on reactions various readers have had or might be imagined
to have to it. Many of these reactions would come as a complete
shock to O'Connor; certainly they came as a surprise to me when I
taught the story. Neither O'Connor as author nor I as teacher
could fully manage or control the readings of this story. That, of
course, is my point.
A.

Counsel for Oedipus: Feminist Manifesto or Sexist Tract?

On one level, Counsel for Oedipus is about litigants who,
having seen how the legal system deals with their dispute, call a
halt to the litigation described in the story and find their own

jurisprudence's three "generations," see Adelaide H. Villmoare, Feminist
Jurisprudenceand PoliticalVision, 24 LAW & SOC. INQ. 443 (1999).
15. Kimberle Crenshaw, A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination
Law and Politics, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 356
(David Kairys ed., 3d ed. 1998); Angela Harris, Race and Essentialism in
Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581 (1990); Minow, supra note 6, at
47-48.
16. Baron, supra note 9, at 1068-70.
17. I have criticized some within the law-and-lit movement for treating

literature as if it had a clear message for law, whereas I believe most literary
works are not fables and do not carry simple morals. It does not follow from
this critique that literature is incapable of being used to teach lawyers or law

students. Analogously, one might be skeptical about at least some claims
made by the law and economics movement and yet still find it useful in certain
instances to use economics in examining law. The question is not whether
literature (or economics or philosophy or history) can be useful to lawyers, but

how.
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resolution to the problems that brought them into court."8 In the
story (here comes the plot summary of which I warned you), Nellie
Lynam has sued her husband Tom for legal separation on the
"The adultery," O'Connor
grounds of cruelty and adultery.
telegraphs in the story's second paragraph, "was admitted, and all
that was needed to prove the cruelty was to put Tom Lynam in the
box. He was a big, good-looking man with a stiff, morose manner;
one of those men who are deceptively quiet and good-humored for
months on end and then lay you out with a stick for a casual
remark about politics." 9 Therefore, it appears at the start of the
story that Nellie has a lock on the outcome: in addition to Tom's
undeniable and undenied relationship with another woman, by
whom he has had an acknowledged child, there is the fact that the
And the direct
judge, O'Meara, has "a mother fixation.""0
examination of Nellie by her lawyer Kenefick fills in whatever
might still be missing of the cruelty piece. Her testimony details
how Tom called her names too horrible to be uttered aloud, and
how he literally kicked her out of their house in plain sight of their
five-year-old son."1 In light of Tom's verbal and physical abuse,
how could Nellie lose?
But the crafty cross-examination of Nellie by Tom's attorney,
Mickie Joe Dougherty, demonstrates that Nellie is not what she
seemed. "It cannot be pretended," O'Connor tells us, "that, the
best day he ever was, Mickie Joe was much of a lawyer or made a
good appearance in court."2 2 But Mickie Joe is a "woman-hater,"
the "one [sort of] person," O'Connor explains, "who can stand up to
a man with a mother fixation."22 Mickie Joe in this instance is
devastatingly effective. Nellie, it emerges, is no paragon of a wife:
she fails to cook for her husband, will not go out visiting with him,
embarrasses him before his friends, spoils his children to the point
where they cannot be cared for by others, and, most tellingly, has
refused to have sexual relations with him for over two years. As
Mickie Joe's cross-examination proceeds, O'Connor tells us, "You
couldn't any longer see [Nellie] the way you had seen her first.
Whether it was right or wrong, another picture was beginning to
emerge of a woman who was both ruthless and designing and who
ruled her great brute of a husband by her weakness."24
18. Paraphrasing literature into other words is inevitably an exercise in
working with the second best; I will not pretend to do full justice to O'Connor's
sprightly written text.
19. O'Connor, supra note 8, at 442.
20. Id. at 442. In this respect, O'Connor sees O'Meara merely as a token of
a type: "As for judges-every single one that I've known had a mother
fixation." Id.
21. Id. at 443.
22. Id. at 444.
23. Id. at 446.
24. Id. at 446.
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Ironically, Tom had not told Mickey Joe of any of this. The
misogynistic Mickie Joe has "stumbled on the truth" by sheer
intuition, and Tom, meanwhile, is astounded and incredulous that
Mickie Joe has discerned so much about his marriage. 25 Tom is
also furious. Although it is clear to all but Nellie when court
adjourns for the day that her case is effectively lost, Tom jumps up
and follows Nellie as she leaves. They talk, after which Tom
26
announces that "Nellie and me are settling this between us."
Mickie Joe is infuriated to see his incipient legal victory wasted.
"A man tries to help you," he whines, "but it is only talent thrown
away. Go and commit suicide in your own way. I have nothing
further to do with you." 27 And here is Tom's response: "There's a
pair of us there ....
I do not know where you got your
information, but you can go back to the people that told you and
tell them to mind their own business. I won't let you or anyone
talk to my wife that way."28
What happens in this story? In one reading, what happens is
that Tom chooses to exit the legal system because he is disgusted
with the law's inability to account for the kind of pair he and
Nellie really are. In this reading, the law is revealed to both Tom
and the reader as inadequate to cope with the nuances of real
human relationships. When the litigants see how the law portrays
them, the categories to which it reduces them, they take matters
into their own hands. Relationship triumphs over rule in the
end. 9
Both feminists and law-and-lits have noted how the legal
system, with its formal rules, its tendency to classify, its
propensity for zero-sum, winner-take-all solutions, can never quite
capture the subtleties of intimate human connections. ° In this
sense, the story depicts a form of alternative dispute resolution of
which at least relational feminists might approve. Such a feminist
might argue that it is better that Tom and Nellie work things out
themselves as the "pair" Tom has recognized they are. Many lawand-lits would concur. What I have elsewhere called "humanist"
law-and-lits have consistently argued that the law tends to be
bloodless, unemotional, and insensitive to context, abstract and

25. O'Connor, supra note 8, at 447.
26. Id. at 449.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 449-50.
29. See generally JOHN M. CONLEY & WILLIAM M. O'BARR, RULES VERSUS
RELATIONSHIPS (1990).
30. For a thoughtful elaboration on the relation between justice and the
values associated with the ethic of care, see ROBIN WEST, CARING FOR JUSTICE
22-93 (1997). See also Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Portia in a Different Voice:
Speculations on a Women's Lawyering Process, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 39
(1985) (exploring how a concern for connection might affect lawyering styles).
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inflexible.3 Such law-and-lits could easily and approvingly read
Counsel for Oedipus as being about the limits of law and the
superiority of solutions that rest, not on abstract legal categories,
but on concrete human connections.
Yet, is it correct to read this story as the expression of ideas
congenial to feminism or to law and literature? Counsel for
Oedipus depends critically upon, and to a degree, is positively
composed of stereotypes: the alcoholic abusive husband, the
passive aggressive harridan wife, not to mention the motherfixated judge and the woman-hating lawyer. The story employs
these stereotypes, as many readers no doubt picked up from the
plot summary alone, in a particularly invidious way. The story
can be read to suggest that the undutiful, unmaternal, asexual
wife deserves to be beaten by her husband. The theme of Mickie
Joe's cross-examination is that Tom's adultery and cruelty are
both excusable because Nellie brought them on herself by her
failure to be the conventionally good wife. "When the court
adjourned," O'Connor writes, "Mickie Joe's cross-examination
wasn't over, but he could easily have closed there, for even [Judge]
O'Meara's mother fixation could find nothing to fix on in the
petitioner's case."32
"Nothing?"one might ask. If a woman does not cook dinner
for her husband, is it fine for him to kick her? If she is not
interested in sex, is he justified in physically throwing her out of
the house? Have we learned so little about battering that this
story can still make sense to us? Does it not perpetuate the notion
that the nonsubmissive wife forfeits her claim to decent
treatment? How could a feminist read this story without becoming
furious?
Perhaps these worries are overdrawn. There is a reading of
the story in which it is the stereotypes and the way in which
stereotypes get things wrong-that educate Tom and Nellie both
to see their relationship more clearly. Unlike the reading with
which I began, in which Tom already knows something about his
marriage that the law cannot quite grasp, in this reading the law's
mischaracterization helps Tom come to see his relationship in a
different way. By walking away with Nellie, Tom says in effect,
"we may be an abusive husband and a passive wife, but yet we are
not only this; we are, to emphasize these words again, 'a pair.'
Stereotypes flatten unruly contours; to see oneself depicted as a
stereotype is also to see the dimensions that have been omitted,
dimensions perhaps not previously apprehended. Tom's calling a
halt to the proceedings could reflect an understanding that there
is more between him and Nellie than he had appreciated. This

31. See, e.g., Baron, supra note 9, at 1078-81.
32. O'Connor, supra note 8, at 449.
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reading renders Counsel for Oedipus once again palatable to both
feminists and law-and-lits, for both movements are critically
concerned with the effects of stereotypes.
On the other hand, there is yet an alternative reading that
In this reading, Tom is
supports feminists' worst fears.
embarrassed because, at the trial, other people come to know the
details of his relationship with Nellie. Recall that Tom, unaware
that Mickie Joe simply guessed the details of his marriage, enjoins
Mickie Joe to "go back to the people that told you and tell them to
mind their own business."33 The trial testimony demonstrated that
he received far less from his wife than a husband should expect to
receive. He had to get his own meals, do his own shopping, search
for sex outside his own house. He ends the trial and takes Nellie
back so there will be no further public disclosures, but the end of
the trial does not guarantee the end of the abuse. Indeed, the
story's conclusion re-enacts one of the most frightening aspects of
abusive relationships, that is, that they are difficult to escape and
are re-entered with the apparent willingness of the victim.34 The
law, in this reading, underwrites Tom's abusive behavior because
in court both spouses have learned that Nellie's failures as a wife
positively warrant physical punishment. If she does not satisfy
him in the future, they both know he is sanctioned to beat her for
it.
B. Which Reading?
What are we to make of these conflicting readings? One
interpretation is that they support what proponents of law and
literature have asserted for a very long time: literature is a rich,
multi-faceted and provocative source through which to view law.
Although that assertion may have merit, part of the richness being
celebrated is the multiplicity of possible readings, and here the
many possible readings conflict. While it is easy and probably
correct to say that no one of them is the right reading, some are
not benign. It hardly advances the cause of women to teach a
story about law's formality that inadvertently endorses the
proposition that battering is either inevitable or justified. What
should be done about these non-transformational readings?
Can the negative readings of Counsel for Oedipus be ruled out
by setting the story in historical context? Frank O'Connor was
born in Ireland in 1903, and his short stories were largely written
and published between 1945 and 1961. 3' Perhaps one can make
33. Id. at 449-50.
34. See Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining
the Issue of Separation,90 MICH. L. REV. 1, 34-43 (1991).
35. The biographical information presented here is drawn from 8 THE NEW
ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 869 (15th ed. 1998); THE CAMBRIDGE
BIOGRAPHICAL ENCYCLOPEDIA 709 (David Crystal ed., 1994); CHAMBERS
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sense of the less pleasant aspects of Counsel for Oedipus when one
considers that even the "women's liberation" or "women's rights"
precursors of contemporary feminism had yet to come on the scene
when O'Connor wrote. Besides (and understand that I have my
tongue in my cheek here), O'Connor was Irish, writing about
Ireland. Surely it is possible for the reader to read the story, in
light of the time and place in which it was written, as one about
Irish rural society, or about marriage and the law, and not as one
about "battering," a term O'Connor had likely never heard applied
to women.
Still, context may not entirely tame the sexist implications of
the story. O'Connor seems to want the reader to be ambivalent
about Tom's decision to decline the freedom the law was about to
grant him and instead to remain with Nellie. The story closes
with Mickie Joe musing, as he watches Tom and Nellie depart
together:
that never would they see justice done to a man in a court of law. It
was like Oedipus. You could not say whether it was the Destiny
that pursued the man or the man the Destiny; but you could be
quite sure that nothing in the world would ever keep the two of
them apart.36
Of course, these are Mickie Joe's sentiments, and it is not
clear whether O'Connor means the reader to take them literally or
ironically. Still, setting the woman-inevitably-bests-man theme in
historical perspective only underscores the extent to which
generalizations about gender that today would raise hackles were,
in O'Connor's day, used without the slightest embarrassment or
self-consciousness. 7
Yet although historical context may not exactly exclude-and
may even support-the sexist rather than the feminist readings of
Counsel for Oedipus, it may still be well to keep context in mind if
we have to decide among readings. This point was brought home
to be my students, who offered a reading I never anticipated. They
read Counsel for Oedipus in a seminar ponderously titled "Ethical
Perspectives on the Practice of Law."0" The course explores the
ethical dimensions of the most apparently technical and prosaic
BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY 1387 (Melanie Parry ed., 1997).

36. O'Connor, supra note 8, at 450.
37. The opening of the story only confirms this point:

To sit in court and watch a case between wife and husband is like seeing
a performance of Oedipus. You know that no matter what happens the

man hasn't a chance .... Even the man's own counsel will be ashamed
of him and envy counsel for the wife, who, whatever she did or didn't do,
has the ear of the court.
Id. at 442. While in one sense, O'Connor's story is about the ways in which
this is not true, but it works only by turning the stereotype around, not by
rejecting or challenging the stereotype.
38. I co-teach this course with my Temple colleague, Richard K. Greenstein.
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decisions lawyers make-how they define their clients' legal
problems, how they frame issues, how they discuss facts, and so
forth.
Since the students were reading the story for a course on legal
ethics, they focused on the conduct of the lawyers. Mickie Joe,
they pointed out, never obtained Tom's permission to, in effect,
expose and humiliate Nellie. While lawyers have a certain
latitude under most ethical codes to determine what tactics will be
used in furtherance of the client's ends, this decision, in many
students' eyes, crossed the line; the humiliation of Nellie was less
a "tactic" than an end in itself for the woman-hating Mickie Joe,
and ends are for the client, not the lawyer, to choose. 9 Mickie Joe,
the students argued, should have told Tom of his plans, and
proceeded only if Tom agreed. In this reading, Tom took matters
into his own hands not because the legal system-its procedures
and rules-were unsuited to the nature of the dispute at hand, but
because his lawyer behaved in a manner to which Tom had never
consented and of which he disapproved.
Surely, we should be dubious whether the students' reading
would even make sense to O'Connor. Assuming authorial intent to
be relevant to anything, it seems unlikely that O'Connor wrote
with an audience of ethically sensitized lawyers in mind. Nor
would the typical reader of The New Yorker, where many of
O'Connor's stories were first published, be aware of distinctions
between "tactical" and other kinds of decisions.
Still, the students had a point. That point did relate to the
course, though we had not meant them to focus on technical
compliance with ethical rules. I could not say their reading was
wrong or unfair, for in the story Tom is furious with Mickie Joe
and does not feel the latter truly represented him. And yet, their
point seems wholly unconnected to the one O'Connor intended to
make.
Considering what O'Connor probably did not have in mind
when he wrote Counsel for Oedipus helps demonstrate how context
pre-determines what we will find in a story. It reminds us that we
read through the window of our own preoccupations. What the
story is about in some measure depends on the framework through
which we read it and the concerns with which we approach it. The
students' highly technical,
compliance oriented reading
exemplifies this phenomenon-in an ethics class, they read for
ethics. One should hardly be surprised or embarrassed, then, that
39. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Rule 1.2

(1998) (stating that "[a] lawyer shall abide by a client's decisions concerning

the objectives of representation . . ., and shall consult with the client as to the
means by which they are to be pursued."). The Comment states that "the
client has ultimate authority to determine the purposes to be served by legal
representation." Id. at cmt. 1.
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feminists might read for portraits of women. Yet it is beneficial to
be aware of this phenomenon. It is impossible to read the story
pure, unfiltered by any concern, point of view, or interest.

II. "LAW" AND "LIFE"
Context can help the reader see how starting points and
background assumptions affect what she or he takes from the
story. Will this awareness tame the more dangerous, sexist
readings to which the story is subject? It is not yet entirely clear.
Let us return to those earlier readings of Counsel for Oedipus that
treat the story as one about the connection between
stereotypes--and legal argumentation. These readings have a
feminist cast in that they highlight a gap between the complexity
of actual experience and the relative simplicity with which
experiences tend to be portrayed by those who have not actually
shared them. These readings would also find favor among those
law-and-lits who compare the subtlety with which events are
portrayed in literature to the relatively cruder portrayals in legal
and similar fora.
In Counsel for Oedipus, Nellie's lawyer, Kenefick, not only
elicits example after example of Tom's verbal and physical
roughness, but he presents Nellie-or has Nellie present herselfin a manner calculated to play to Judge O'Meara's mother fixation.
For example, Kenefick depicts Nellie as being too demure to repeat
aloud the names her husband called her and too weak to resist her
husband's great physical force. On direct examination, Tom is the
quintessential lout; Nellie is the quintessential wife, mother, and
victim. When it is his turn, Mickie Joe Dougherty turns the tables
not only by showing that Nellie is not what she had seemed, but
that she is a very different type-selfish, lazy, and manipulative.
All of these types fit what Gerald Lopez has called a "stock
story"; a large explanatory picture suggested by a small number of
telling details." Every reader carries around an ample array of
these stories; they are part of the cognitive equipment with which
one reduces and thereby copes with the complexity of the world."
The tactics employed by Kenefick and Dougherty are realistic in
that lawyers in fact often employ "stock stories" both in order to
telegraph information when there is no time to put it directly into
evidence and to invoke appealing, positive images. Effective crossexaminations show, as did Mickie Joe's, that the facts do not fit
the story, and that a different, less flattering story may be more
apt.

40. Gerald Lopez, Lay Lawyering, 32 UCLA L. REV. 1, 5-6 (1984).
41. See Winter, The Cognitive Dimension, supra note 6, at 2234 (describing
how "unconscious structures of thought" are invoked "automatically and
reflexively to make sense of new information.").
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"Stock stories" are in many ways just reasonably
sophisticated stereotypes. Like all stereotypes, they accurately
capture some, but not all, aspects of a person or situation.42 What
leaks out of the confined boundaries of the "stock story" or
stereotype is the "good stuff," the facets of personality or
relationship that are unique or unusual, that make individuals
individual. One way of understanding what happens in Counsel
for Oedipus is that Tom cannot stand to see either himself or
Nellie as a caricature, so he opts out of the legal system of
artificial "types" to live his "real" life.
The feminist and law-and-lit friendly readings just described
turn on Tom and Nellie's resistance to formal, categorical
portraits. However, in these readings, it is not entirely clear
whether it is the law that Tom rejects, or the stereotypes. Is the
conflict, in other words, between rules or law on one side, and
relationships or "real life" on the other? Or is it instead between
one way of seeing life, a way that reduces it to lifeless forms, and
another, which insists on its unruly vitality?
One might ask, does law not always reduce, flatten, and
categorize, so that there is no real choice between rejecting law
and rejecting stereotypes?
This question is a pivotal one,
highlighting a certain ambiguity in the claims made by feminists
and law-and-lits alike. If law always reduces the complexity of the
lived world to mere stereotypes, then the compare-and-contrast
strategies which both feminists and law-and-lits have employed to
demonstrate problems in legal conceptualizations and procedures
are doomed to failure. The same is true of the strategysometimes associated with feminism and sometimes with law and
literature-of using fictional or actual, literary or legal (if a
distinction exists) stories to expose the artificiality of the law's
depictions of the world in general and women in particular.4 3 Both
the legal storytelling and the law and literature movements have
drawn a fair amount of criticism; some would say more than their
fair share, especially with respect to legal storytelling."
Mercifully, the debates need not be rehashed here. What is worth
noting is that if legal analysis requires oversimplification, if it
necessarily relies on stereotypes, then it will not help to point out,
as the compare-and-contrast and the storytelling techniques are

42. For a demonstration, using examples from the context of law school
hiring, see generally Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and
Others: A Plea for Narrative,87 MICH. L. REV. 2411 (1989).
43. See, e.g., Vicki Schultz, Telling Stories about Women and Work: Judicial
Interpretations of Sex Segregation in the Workplace in Title VII Cases Raising
the Lack of InterestArgument, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1749 (1990).
44. Probably the best known of these critiques is Daniel A. Farber &
Suzanna Sherry, Telling Stories Out of School: An Essay on Legal Narratives,
45 STAN. L. REV. 807 (1993).
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designed to do, the ways in which law omits or distorts various
aspects of women's lives. At worst, the law will simply ignore the
lessons that the contrasts and stories are offered to impart. At
best, it will incorporate the lessons into new, but still
oversimplified and flat, depictions.
It seems more accurate and more sensible to understand the
projects of legal feminism and of the law and literature movement
as reflecting a belief that law can better reflect lived experiencesespecially the experiences of women. At the very least, law can
reflect the multiple ways in which those experiences might be
described. Under this view, it makes sense to try to compare legal
and nonlegal depictions of events, to tell stories, and to read
literature.
The alternative accounts may correct the law,
interposing for a stereotypical view one that is more true to life.
They may also reveal the manner in which various conflicting
visions of life compete for acceptance.4" But only a view of law as
at least susceptible to change renders coherent the compare-andcontrast and the storytelling strategies of feminism and law and
literature.
The rhetoric of both movements has, however, obscured this
more logical presupposition.
As they describe it, law never
actually seems to change. It always requires the correction of new
stories; it remains in perennial need of the edification of literature.
No matter how often law's stories are exposed for their
incompleteness or slant, no matter how often Shakespeare or
Melville is invoked to demonstrate some point of legal obtuseness
or blunder, law remains incomplete, slanted, and obtuse-a
perpetual enemy force. Law must be capable of reformation, or
why read The Merchant of Venice, Billy Budd, or the first person
accounts of those whose experiences do not match the "authorized
story" that underlies various legal rules and statutes?"
But
somehow law is never actually reformed, or symposia such as this
one would, like the state under communism, ultimately wither
away for lack of need. How can this be?
The beginning of an answer to this question requires more
careful attention to what is meant by the term "law" when used in
contrast or conjunction with terms such as feminism, literature, or
language. The very idea of examining the multiplicity of languages

45. These two tasks reflect different epistemological premises. For an
explanation, see generally Jane B. Baron & Julia Epstein, Is Law Narrative?,
45 BUFF. L. REv. 141, 171-73 (1997).
46. Exactly what should be read is a matter of some controversy. See, e.g.,

WEST, supra note 30, at 195 (discussing the canon and outsiders); Judith
Resnik, Changing the Topic, 8 CARDOZO STUD. L. & LITERATURE 339 (1996)
(discussing the canon and women); RICHARD WEISBERG, POETHICS AND OTHER
STRATEGIES OF LAW AND LITERATURE 117-23 (1992) (defending the traditional
canon).
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within the law assumes a divide between the "inside" of law and a
domain that is not "within," but somehow "outside" the law.
Contrasts between law and literature, and between literary and
legal uses of language, assume a similar divide between domains.
The inside/outside divide structures several of the aforementioned
proposed readings of Counsel for Oedipus, in which the story turns
on the fact that the depictions of the Lynams' marriage inside the
courtroom, that is, inside the law, diverge from the marriage as it
exists or is experienced outside the legal realm.
One danger of not attending to how we draw the divide
between what is inside and what is outside law is that, at least
rhetorically, the tendency seems to put everything undesirable on
the law side. For example, when contrasted with literature, law
tends to be portrayed as amoral, technical, mechanical, and above
all, doctrinal, while literature is portrayed as the opposite: morally
uplifting, subtle, and emotional. But, we are all aware of aspects
of law that are highly moral (and flexible and nondoctrinal), while
some literature is extremely unemotional and exemplifies rather
than condemns dangerous values. Similarly, legal language is
often portrayed as dry and insensitive, in implicit contrast to
language outside legal contexts, which is presumably rich and
nuanced. However, some legal language (think of Cardozo's
famous decisions) is obviously rich and nuanced, while language
outside of law is often dry or insensitive.
One may have to face the unpleasant possibility that the
reification of law in the contrasts between law and literature, legal
and nonlegal language, and the like is part of what helps construct
law as a domain in need of reconstitution and reform. If legal
language is powerful, if it matters how the law "speaks," then the
same must be applied to those who talk about law, and about law's
talk. The more feminists and law-and-lits point to the ways in
which law is constructed to ignore the needs and interests of
outsiders, the more the movements' rhetoric constructs the legal
domain as one in which these needs or interests cannot be taken
into account. This is the control problem I mentioned earlier:
there is no telling where all this talk of social construction will
take us. We seem, despite ourselves, to be culturally invested in a
vision of law as a cold and foreign domain that, as in Counsel of
Oedipus, can never quite connect to the world with which we are
familiar.
A second danger of not being careful about how we define law
for purposes of contrasting it with literature, nonlegal language,
etc. is the danger of unduly narrowing what we think of as "law."
Statutes, cases, and administrative regulations are clearly "law,"
and one would similarly label the conduct that occurs in
courtrooms, police stations, and law firm offices as "legal."
However, law is not confined to obviously "legal" spaces. As the
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law and society movement emphasizes, it exists all over,47 where
we drop our coins in parking meters, make our marriage vows, pay
our minimum credit card balances, assert that the irritating words
uttered by our bosses at work constitute sexual harassment, or tell
our neighbors to keep off our property." Ignoring these important
sites in which law operates unnoticed but powerfully makes it
easier to draw contrasts: if one thinks only of the law in courts and
statute books, the gap between law and life will naturally seem
huge. If one insists on seeing the law that infuses daily life, then
the gap narrows substantially. Indeed, it is unclear that "gap"
remains the correct metaphor. One may need to consider whether
the categories "law" and "ordinary life" are not two ways of
describing a single set of experiences, rather than two altogether
separate categories. However, if this redescription is accurate,
some of the cherished dichotomies of the feminist and law and
literature movements will need to be rethought. "Sterile" law can
no longer be opposed to "rich" literature; nor can we easily
compare depictions of women in law to those in ordinary life (since
law is "in" that ordinary life).
III.

WOMEN AND GIRLS

It will not do to treat as socially constructed only those
images, concepts, and procedures of which one, for whatever
reason, disapproves, while treating as natural or "real" those one
wishes to interpose. When law's artificiality is contrasted to
experiences described as more "real," it is legitimate to ask, "more
real in what sense?" If one is to take social construction seriouslyand it should be added that many on both the left and the right
think that this is a very bad idea indeed4 9-one must be willing to
question not whether but how our own "real" experiences are
themselves socially constructed.
In addition, social construction does not happen only in law,
and law is not the only agent of social construction.
The
comparisons and contrasts of feminism and of law and lit are
among the many notions that participate in constructing the social

47. See Austin Sarat, "The Law Is All Over": Power, Resistance, and the
Legal Consciousness of the Welfare Poor, 2 YALE J.L. & HUM. 343 (1990)
(discussing how the welfare poor have a strong knowledge of the law yet are
subject to its power).
48. For a rich description of the multiple sites in which law might be seen
to reside, see PATRICIA EWICK & SUSAN S. SILBEY, THE COMMON PLACE OF
LAW (1998).
49. From the left, see Catharine A. MacKinnon, Law's Stories as Reality
and Politics, in LAW'S STORIES: NARRATIVE AND RHETORIC IN THE LAW 232
(Peter Brooks & Paul Gewirtz eds., 1996). From the right, see GERTRUDE
HiMMELFARB, ON LOOKING INTO THE ABYSS: UNTIMELY THOUGHTS ON
CULTURE AND SOCIETY (1994).
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world.5 ° The world of law they would construct is a world about
which we ought to have our doubts. Do we want a world of law
that is forever separate and fallen?
Of course, if tomorrow we ceased to compare and contrast and
to tell stories, we would not thereby escape participation in the
forces of social construction. Furthermore, we will not be better
able to "control" the effects of whatever alternative strategies we
might develop.
With all this in mind, let us return to Julia Roberts' "I'm just
a girl" line from Notting Hill. Referring to a grown woman as a
girl does call up stereotypes from another time, as described at the
outset of this article. Yet, the term "woman," especially when used
self-consciously, may call upon other, more recently-generated
stereotypes-of pushy, edgy females who never lighten up and who
cannot take a joke, either. There does not seem to be any
language in which to talk about women that does not replicate the
problems we are trying to talk our way out of.
My own view is that this apparent paradox is not actually a
problem. We may be able to think, or to speak, ourselves into a
clearer view of where we stand (and do not stand) in the social
world, but we should not aspire to stand outside the social world.
We must speak of ourselves somehow, in some words, and any
account of those words that is nuanced enough to be interesting or
useful is likely to resist reduction into anything like prescription.
Recently, I have noticed that many of my students-women as
well as men, and feminist women at that-refer to themselves and
their friends as "girls." Should they not have the same privilege to
decide what they should be called that we feminists from a slightly
different generation claimed for ourselves to decide what they
should be called? It could be, then, that the choice between "girl"
and "woman" is less about transformation than aesthetics.
Aesthetics are by no means trivial. In a world where all is
constructed, aesthetics matter.

50. I will not here assess whether they are even a fraction as powerful as
the notions that come to us, say, from television advertising.

